This project has been supported by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council (project number CS170100008); the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science; and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. ACOLA collaborates with the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences and the New Zealand Royal Society Te Apārangi to deliver the interdisciplinary Horizon Scanning reports to government. The aims of the project which produced this report are: 1. Examine the transformative role that artificial intelligence may play in (...) different sectors of the economy, including the opportunities, risks and challenges that advancement presents. 2. Examine the ethical, legal and social considerations and frameworks required to enable and support broad development and uptake of artificial intelligence. 3. Assess the future education, skills and infrastructure requirements to manage workforce transition and support thriving and internationally competitive artificial intelligence industries. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Aristotle's thoughts on moral weakness, or Akrasia, with a look at the contributions of other philosophers, such as, Socrates and Plato on this subject.

It is a well known empirical observation that natural axiomatic theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength. For any natural theory $T$, the next strongest natural theory is $T+\mathsf{Con}_T$. We formulate and prove a statement to the effect that the consistency operator is the weakest natural way to uniformly extend axiomatic theories.

This paper is an investigation of the relationship between G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem and the well-foundedness of jump hierarchies. It follows from a classic theorem of Spector's that the relation $\{(A,B) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : \mathcal{O}^A \leq_H B\}$ is well-founded. We provide an alternative proof of this fact that uses G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem instead of the theory of admissible ordinals. We then derive a semantic version of the second incompleteness theorem, originally due to Mummert and Simpson, from this result. Finally, (...) we turn to the calculation of the ranks of reals in this well-founded relation. We prove that, for any $A\in\mathbb{R}$, if the rank of $A$ is $\alpha$, then $\omega_1^A$ is the $(1 + \alpha)^{\text{th}}$ admissible ordinal. It follows, assuming suitable large cardinal hypotheses, that, on a cone, the rank of $X$ is $\omega_1^X$. (shrink)

Heidegger qualifies his work with the surprising assertion “I have no philosophy at all.” In this paper, I argue that, to make sense of this odd claim, we must carefully investigate his reflections on philosophical showing. While Heidegger never finished the segment of Being and Time intended to address this issue explicitly, the clues he offers in the published portion of the text indicate that, for him, successful philosophical showing takes place not primarily through a coherent collection of philosophical assertions (...) – that is, through “having a philosophy” – but rather through a certain well-placed interruption of these assertions: an interruption that, when employed in the right context and in the right manner, successfully points out certain particularly elusive phenomena. As I demonstrate, this mode of showing requires that we quite radically rethink what Heidegger is doing – and what we ourselves are doing – in philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Serious ethical violations in medicine, such as sexual abuse, criminal prescribing of opioids, and unnecessary surgeries, directly harm patients and undermine trust in the profession of medicine. We review the literature on violations in medicine and present an analysis of 280 cases. Nearly all cases involved repeated instances of intentional wrongdoing, by males in nonacademic medical settings, with oversight problems and a selfish motive such as financial gain or sex. More than half of cases involved a wrongdoer with a suspected (...) personality disorder or substance use disorder. Despite clear patterns, no factors provide readily observable red flags, making prevention difficult. Early identification and intervention in cases requires significant policy shifts that prioritize the safety of patients over physician interests in privacy, fair processes, and proportionate disciplinary actions. We explore a series of 10 questions regarding policy, oversight, discipline, and education options. Satisfactory answers to these questions will require input from diverse stakeholders to help society negotiate effective and ethically balanced solutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LettersJames L. Walsh, Moira M. McQueen, Kevin O'Rourke, and Jean deBloisEarly Delivery of the Anencephalic InfantMadam:In the March 1994 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Kevin O'Rourke and Jean deBlois have replied to an article of ours (KIEJ, December 1993) on the early induction of the anencephalic fetus. They agree with our conclusion that such early delivery may be morally acceptable, but argue that our justification (...) is flawed. Exchanges on the subject probably could continue ad nauseam; here we simply state some of the elements of their article that leave us perplexed.1. The phrase "prolonging the life of" (p. 49) has one meaning in the case of artificial life supports, which may be unwarranted interventions, but it has a different meaning when it refers to not interfering with a person's enjoyment of necessary natural means of preserving his or her life. Inducing labor prior to viability, which denies the natural means of life support without a possible substitute, has more in common with smothering a dying patient than the nonemployment of or withdrawing of artificial means of life support. To refer to the death of the fetus here as an effect is rather like saying that I suffocated you and the effect of the suffocation is your death. This is quite different from induction after viability where the induction can have different effects.2. If the authors were correct that "the prohibition on inducing delivery before viability is predicated upon the assumption that the fetus in utero is a human being with the potential for further development" (p. 49) and the anencephalic has none, why is there need to employ the principle of double effect? They say that there is no moral obligation to prolong the life of the anencephalic fetus. Just as there is no need for the principle in cases of withdrawing unwarranted artificial life support, so there would be no need for it here. Because the authors seem to perceive a complete disjunction between direct and indirect killing (allowing to die being in the category of indirect killing), it seems that they are unable to let their argument rest here, but have to justify the death that occurs.3. The example concerning smothering and the nonemployment of aggressive interventions (p. 49) explains well the difference between killing and allowing to die. But allowing to die is not indirectly killing since it occurs as a result of the disease and not from the causality of the agent.4. How can we cause something and not intend it? There are instances in which we simply "permit" evil events, but where we are not the cause. For example, evil events may be attributable to the bad will of others. Legislators make just laws knowing that some people of bad will will break them for their own advantage. Here the legislators really do permit evil. Neither are we the cause of death when we allow a person to die by not imposing unwarranted means of life support; we permit his or her death. But can we so readily designate by "permit" [End Page 184] what we knowingly choose to bring about? O'Rourke and deBlois use interchangeably "indirectly intended" and "unintended" for what is caused by our actions; "indirectly intended" is a better designation than "unintended." The whole package, including all foreseen effects, is intended. Evil "happening" (p. 51) as a result of an action that I place can refer either to evil as caused by my action or to evil as arising from a cause apart from my action. Only in this latter sense do I permit evil and not intend it, either directly or indirectly.5. The fourth condition of the principle of double effect is given as follows: "There must be a proportionately grave reason for placing the act. The greater the evil, the more cogent the reason must be for performing the act" (p. 50). How the authors can abstract from balancing goods and evils here is beyond us.6. We cannot follow the authors' use of the term "morally good" with respect to the induced delivery (p. 50). The problem is concerned with the morally right... (shrink)

On the nature of Aristotle's Ethics, by R. A. Gauthier.--Reason, happiness, and goodness, by F. Siegler.--The nature of aims, by J. Dewey.--Thought and action in Aristotle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--On forgetting the difference between right and wrong, by G. Ryle.--Aristotle and the punishment of psychopaths, by V. Haksar.--Suggested further readings (p. 121-123).

In situations where anencephaly is diagnosed and where the mother's life or health is threatened Roman Catholic hospitals are faced with the dilemma of waiting until viability before inducing the fetus, thus potentially putting the mother at further risk. According to most Roman Catholic ethicists, induced delivery before viability is contrary to the Church's prohibition of direct killing of the innocent. The authors propose for discussion a reconsideration of this position in the case of the anencephalic fetus and conclude that (...) taking the life of such a fetus does not constitute an attack on its personal dignity and therefore is morally permissible. (shrink)

What will it take for business to improve lives? Many think we need a theoretically sound meta-narrative to articulate the proper place for business in our lives. Important as that is, this meta-narrative will only come to life when everyone articulates his and her personal narrative, shares it with others, and ultimately fine-tunes it into a personal theory-in-use, one that guides everyday decision-making. Hoping that the Humanistic Management Association willsoon find room on its webpage for those of us in business (...) and business education to share our values and beliefs with each other, I thought I would start usoff by sharing mine here. (shrink)

Why are natural theories pre-well-ordered by consistency strength? In previous work, an approach to this question was proposed. This approach was inspired by Martin's Conjecture, one of the most prominent conjectures in recursion theory. Fixing a reasonable subsystem $T$ of arithmetic, the goal was to classify the recursive functions that are monotone with respect to the Lindenbaum algebra of $T$. According to an optimistic conjecture, roughly, every such function must be equivalent to an iterate $\mathsf{Con}_T^\alpha$ of the consistency operator ``in (...) the limit'' within the ultrafilter of sentences that are true in the standard model. In previous work the author established the first case of this optimistic conjecture; roughly, every recursive monotone function is either as weak as the identity operator in the limit or as strong as $\mathsf{Con}_T$ in the limit. Yet in this note we prove that this optimistic conjecture fails already at the next step; there are recursive monotone functions that are neither as weak as $\mathsf{Con}_T$ in the limit nor as strong as $\mathsf{Con}_T^2$ in the limit. In fact, for every $\alpha$, we produce a function that is cofinally equivalent to $\mathsf{Con}^\alpha_T$ yet cofinally equivalent to $\mathsf{Con}_T$. (shrink)

We present an analogue of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem for systems of second-order arithmetic. Whereas Gödel showed that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi ^0_1$ -sound and $\Sigma ^0_1$ -definable do not prove their own $\Pi ^0_1$ -soundness, we prove that sufficiently strong theories that are $\Pi ^1_1$ -sound and $\Sigma ^1_1$ -definable do not prove their own $\Pi ^1_1$ -soundness. Our proof does not involve the construction of a self-referential sentence but rather relies on ordinal analysis.

It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderedness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the$\Pi ^1_1$reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of$\Pi ^1_1$sound extensions of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$in this ordering. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any$\Pi (...) ^1_1$sound extension of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$. We prove that for any$\Pi ^1_1$sound theoryTextending$\mathsf {ACA}_0^+$, the reflection rank ofTequals the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal ofT. We also prove that the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal of$\alpha $iterated$\Pi ^1_1$reflection is$\varepsilon _\alpha $. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward well-foundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role played by the 'categorical imperative' in the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. I argue that, while this is a theme of major importance in Nancy's work, its overall significance is not immediately evident: on the surface, Nancy appears to be affirming the abstract exigency of the imperative while at the same time depriving it of any possible concrete force. I maintain, however, that a close reading of this theme in terms of other crucial themes (...) in Nancy's writing (namely: 'interruption' and the Heideggerian notion of 'Being-with' [Mitsein, être-avec]) reveals that Nancy's imperative does have concrete implications; indeed, it demands that we rethink the relation between responsibility and the concrete as such. Key Words: communication • community • Jacques Derrida • Martin Heidegger • imperative • Jean-Luc Nancy • responsibility. (shrink)

Ordinal analysis is a research program wherein recursive ordinals are assigned to axiomatic theories. According to conventional wisdom, ordinal analysis measures the strength of theories. Yet what is the attendant notion of strength? In this paper we present abstract characterizations of ordinal analysis that address this question. -/- First, we characterize ordinal analysis as a partition of $\Sigma^1_1$-definable and $\Pi^1_1$-sound theories, namely, the partition whereby two theories are equivalent if they have the same proof-theoretic ordinal. We show that no equivalence (...) relation $\equiv$ is finer than the ordinal analysis partition if both: (1) $T\equiv U$ whenever $T$ and $U$ prove the same $\Pi^1_1$ sentences; (2) $T\equiv T+U$ for every set $U$ of true $\Sigma^1_1$ sentences. In fact, no such equivalence relation makes a single distinction that the ordinal analysis partition does not make. -/- Second, we characterize ordinal analysis as an ordering on arithmetically-definable and $\Pi^1_1$-sound theories, namely, the ordering wherein $T\leq U$ if the proof-theoretic ordinal of $T$ is less than or equal to the proof-theoretic ordinal of $U$. The standard ways of measuring the strength of theories are consistency strength and inclusion of $\Pi^0_1$ theorems. We introduce analogues of these notions---$\Pi^1_1$-reflection strength and inclusion of $\Pi^1_1$ theorems---in the presence of an oracle for $\Sigma^1_1$ truths, and prove that they coincide with the ordering induced by ordinal analysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editors’ NoteJames M. DuBois, Ana S. Iltis, and Heidi A. WalshFrom childhood, David Slakter had undergone tests and invasive procedures to monitor his nephritis. It was not a surprise when in 2015, doctors told him he needed a kidney transplant. The wife of a childhood friend was a close match and gave him one of her kidneys. Before his transplant, aerobic exercise was difficult; a few months after transplant, (...) Slakter could ride his bike, hike, and work out with a personal trainer. He no longer had to weigh food or gauge his potassium consumption, a concern for people with kidney failure. For Slakter, “life post-transplant has been a significant improvement.”Individuals or family members of those who have received an organ transplant from a living or deceased donor share their stories in this issue of Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics. The symposium is titled “Receiving the Gift of Life: Stories from Organ Transplant Recipients.” Organ transplantation can extend an individual’s life by decades. It can also greatly improve an individual’s quality of life, as was Slakter’s experience. At the same time, organ transplantation is expensive and stressful. Recipients can experience complications, including organ rejection, and there are few appealing alternatives.After her heart transplant, author Leilani R. Graham required four open-heart surgeries, ECMO, and an intra-aortic balloon pump. She experienced delirium, necrotizing pneumonia, and severe muscular atrophy that required her to re-learn how to walk. She struggled with weight gain, explosive mood swings, hair loss, and was terrified that her body would reject the new heart. For Graham, “[Transplant] was not the miracle [she] was hoping for.” Graham says she felt unprepared for and inadequately informed about what to expect after her transplant, which left her “battered, beaten, and bruised” with a 12-inch line from neck to navel and “bullet holes” up and down her torso from the chest tubes. When reflecting on her experience post-transplant, Graham says, “It wasn’t the physical trauma that hurt the most. It was that no one seemed surprised [by the aftereffects of transplant].” Seemingly no one, that is except Graham, who calls on transplant providers to “prioritize empathy.”The symposium editors are Jason T. Eberl and Tristan McIntosh. Three commentary articles, written by Macey Leigh Levan, Heather Lannon, and Vidya A. Fleetwood, Roslyn B. Mannon & Krista L. Lentine, offer important insights into the authors’ stories. The editors thank Mid-America Transplant, the UCSF Lung Transplant Program, Donor Connect, William L. Freeman, MD, MPH, MJIL, CIP, Janet Monk, and the individuals who gave anonymous donations to support the publication of this issue, an open-access VOICES edition of the symposium, and accompanying teaching guides.The research article in this issue, “‘A Shell of My Former Self’: Using Figurative Language to Promote Communication about Patient Suffering,” was written by Tyler Tate, Elizabeth Stein, and Robert A. Pearlman. The relief of suffering is a primary goal of medicine. However, the authors note that clinicians often miss or ignore suffering because they focus on the causes rather than the experience of suffering, or the subjective nature of suffering makes it difficult to discuss. The authors believe that “the key to communicating about suffering lies in finding [End Page vii] the right kind of words to describe the experience” and say that figurative language offers a promising approach. In their research, the authors performed qualitative analysis on 52 works of literature and identified 254 excerpts of figurative language with themes of non-physical or psychological suffering. The authors found 13 salient themes: brokenness, diminishment, disorientation, drowning, emptiness, imprisonment, battle, darkness, isolation, invisibility, lifelessness, punishment, and torture. The authors reiterate that developing a shared language of suffering could foster a therapeutic patient-clinician relationship and improve clinicians’ ability to recognize and address a patient’s experience of suffering.María Susana Ciruzzi wrote the first of two case studies included in this issue. “The Sword of King Solomon” addresses a tragic and difficult subject—how to navigate the situation posed by conjoined twins when “any decision will produce damage and suffering.” The case involves two infant male patients born at 37 weeks gestation as omphalo-ischiopagus conjoined twins... (shrink)

Background There is a need for interdisciplinary research to better understand how pedagogical approaches in primary physical education (PE) can support the linked development of physical, cognitive and affective aspects of physical literacy and physical activity behaviors in young children living in deprived areas. The Skill Acquisition Methods fostering Physical Literacy in Early-Physical Education (SAMPLE-PE) study aims to examine the efficacy of two different pedagogies for PE, underpinned by theories of motor learning, to foster physical literacy. Methods SAMPLE-PE will be (...) evaluated through a cluster-randomized controlled trial targeting 5–6 year old children from schools located in areas of high deprivation in Merseyside, North-West England. Schools will be randomly allocated to one of three conditions: Linear Pedagogy, Non-linear Pedagogy, or Control. Non-linear and Linear Pedagogy intervention primary schools will receive a PE curriculum delivered by trained coaches over 15 weeks, while control schools will follow their usual practice. Data will be collected at baseline (T0), immediately post-intervention (T1), and 6 months after the intervention has finished (T2). Children’s movement competence is the primary outcome in this trial. Secondary outcomes include physical activity, perceived competence, motivation, executive functions, and self-regulation. An extensive process evaluation will also examine implementation factors such as intervention context, reach, dose, fidelity and acceptability. Discussion The SAMPLE-PE project will enable better understanding surrounding how to operationalise physical literacy through enrichment of PE practices in early PE. The study will provide robust scientific evidence regarding the efficacy of underpinning PE pedagogy with theories of motor learning to promote the development of physical literacy. Trial Registration Retrospectively registered on 5th September 2018 at ClinicalTrials.gov, a resource provided by the U.S. National Library of Medicine (Identifier: NCT03551366). (shrink)